Friday, September 25, 2009

Strategy Session: How Two-Quarterback Systems Work (09/25/09)

“If you have two quarterbacks, you have none.” Among football pundits, this has become a tautology used against any coach that sees some merit in changing quarterbacks over the course of a season, a quarter, or even a series. The drawbacks are obvious: each quarterback will have varying degrees of experience and composure, a unique skill set, and an approach to attacking a defense informed by those factors. For a passer, subtle changes in ball placement and velocity can derail an offensive gameplan. (From the flip perspective, it’s hard to believe that a coach and a coordinator would have the same confidence in both to run the complete offense.)

But at least two programs have had tremendous success with a two-quarterback system in the last two college football seasons. In looking at LSU and Utah, the benefits strike me as more persuasive than those drawbacks. In 2007, Les Miles alternated between Matt Flynn (a fifth-year senior) and the more athletic Ryan Perrilloux (a third-year sophomore). And Miles and offensive coordinator Gary Crowton did not allow the situation dictate whether Flynn or Perrilloux would be on the field. Flynn led the team back in the fourth quarter against Alabama, and Perrilloux, though almost exclusively used as a running threat, was taking snaps at the beginning of the fourth quarter against Florida - a game in which LSU would score two touchdowns in a late rally (see clip). Perrilloux’s experience would be vital as he would start in place of an injured Flynn the SEC championship against Tennessee. Then, he did not see the field in the National Championship game against Ohio State. (That decision was curious, as the Buckeyes had shown a weakness against mobile quarterbacks, in their only loss of the season, to Juice Williams and the Rose Bowl-bound Illini. But the Tigers prevailed, 38-24, anyway.) Statistically, Perrilloux attempted 25 % as much as Flynn.

Similarly, Kyle Whittingham’s Utah Utes won the 2009 Sugar Bowl against the Alabama Crimson Tide, scoring 31 points (the most that had been scored against the SEC runner-up all season). Though Brian Johnson would get most of the attention (as much attention as the Utes would get), the first touchdown was scored on a designed quarterback draw by his back-up Corbin Louks against the Michigan Wolverines. Statistically, Louks would only attempt seven passes but he would be third on the team in carries (27) and yards (213), with a long of 69 yards. The Mountain West Conference champion would finish #2 overall in the final AP poll.

The offenses of the 2007 Tigers and 2008 Utes were two-quarterback systems that worked, and they worked by careful attention to game situation and play design. (For instance, both Louks and Perilloux would occasionally throw downfield off the option play.) Perhaps more importantly, a coordinator and coach would also have to handle the confidence (or ego) of both players. But the goal of this entry will be strictly Xs and Os.

One of the major struggles so far for the 2009 Tigers is managing a similar quarterback situation, between second-year starter Jordan Jefferson and first-year five-star recruit Russell Shepard. Already, some have questioned how well Shepard (as a run-only threat) is being used. (From what I’ve seen, I doubt that the humble Shepard is disgruntled.) How did these two previous conference champions use the two-quarterback system as an asset in tightly-contested games to their advantage?

In the first clip, offensive coordinator calls a fake reverse option to the left. Early in the first quarter, against #9 Florida’s young, aggressive defense, the call works well for a first down. The Gators load up the box on Perrilloux, predominately used as a running threat, but bite on the fake reverse, clearing a lane for Perrilloux and the option man, Keiland Williams.

When Crowton calls a similar play early in the fourth quarter, the line is unbalanced to the running side (the right this time). Not only will the Tigers probably run the ball, they can only run the ball. The Gators are in good position, but this time the math privileges the Tigers, who gain another first down with the play.

As simple as this strategy is, the last two years is littered with teams that have mismanaged their quarterback situation, including Miami (with Jacory Harris and Robert Marve) and Virginia Tech (with Tyrod Taylor and Sean Glennon). Altogether benching one of those players (as Jim Tressel did with Todd Boeckman) should also qualify as a botched strategy.

Fast-forward to the 2009 LSU Tigers. To this point, Shepard has not attempted a pass, averaging 6.9 yard per rushing attempt on 7 carries. The chief concern with involving Shepard in the passing game more is that Jordan Jefferson has been overly cautious with the ball, choosing to manage games against three unranked teams rather than challenging their defensive backs down field. Whether the Tigers feature Shepard in big games or not, their offensive success will be predicated on Jefferson willingness to do so.

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